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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis revealed numerous shortcomings in the regulation and
supervision of the financial sector. In order to avoid similar crises – or at least
limit their magnitude – there has grown international consensus to increase pub-
lic involvement in the financial sector.
Major international reports identified several gaps in the financial regulatory
framework. In a nutshell, financial products have grown in complexity. Coupled
with their opaque trading, this has resulted in an inadequate apprehension and
spreading of risks. This was further aggravated by an overreliance on deficient
risk assessment by others, notably credit rating agencies. Furthermore, financial
institutions proved to have insufficient buffers in case things went wrong. Super-
visors for their part were unable to detect or prevent the accumulation of risk.
The public sector was also unable to avoid large-scale panic in the financial
markets. In summary, the light regulatory approach was flawed1.
Governments worldwide have started taking measures to tighten their grip on
the financial sector. In addition to individual country efforts, initiatives have
been taken on the regional and international level. In Europe, the European
Union plays a key role in driving such initiatives.
The EU committed itself to an important reform of financial sector regulation.
In its 2009 Communication entitled ‘Driving European recovery2’ the European
Commission lists five key objectives with regard to this reform, namely to:
1. build a more secure supervisory framework;
2. fill in gaps of European and national regulation;
3. improve confidence in the financial sector;
4. adjust risk management of the financial sector;
5. ensure more effective sanctions against market wrongdoing3.
These five objectives are required to achieve the Commission’s overarching final
goal: a sound and secure financial system that operates in a single European
market. The Commission has taken a wide range of regulatory initiatives to
1. For a more comprehensive overview, see: BRUNNERMEIER, M., CROCKETT, A. (e.a.), The Funda-
mental Principles of Financial Regulation, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2009; Financial Services
Authority, The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis, 2009; UNCTAD, The
Global Economic Crisis: Systemic Failures and Multilateral Remedies, Report by the UNCTAD Secretar-
iat Task Force on Systemic Issues and Economic Cooperation, 2009; Group of Thirty, Financial Reform:
A Framework for Financial Stability, 2009 and G-20 Working Group 1, Enhancing Sound Regulation and
Strengthening Transparency, 2009.
2. European Commission, Driving European recovery, 4 March 2009, COM(2009) 114 final.
3. Ibid., pp. 7-8.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
4
meet this goal. The aim is to complete the legislative reforms by the end of
20114.
In this paper we evaluate the European efforts to achieve a sound and secure
financial system. In the first five chapters, we examine the work completed by
European institutions to achieve each of the aforementioned objectives. As a
way of concluding, we provide an overall evaluation by discussing whether or
not efforts will lead to a secure financial system5.
Stijn VERHELST6
4. European Commission, Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, 2 June 2010,
COM(2010) 301 final.
5. Work on this paper was finished on 5 November 2010.
6. Stijn Verhelst is a Research Fellow at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations.5
1. Supervision of the Financial Sector
Financial markets in the EU have become increasingly integrated. In contrast,
financial supervision structures remained fragmented across Member States.
This has resulted in a financial sector that had outgrown its supervisory frame-
work. As a consequence, financial supervision was unable to effectively signal
risks7. The bulk of European efforts in improving financial sector supervision
consists of reforming the supervisory framework. In addition, the Commission
wants to improve the supervision of financial conglomerates.
1.1. A New Supervisory Framework
The reform of the supervisory framework has been high on the European
agenda for a long time. The de Larosière report8 has been of significant impor-
tance in the debate and largely influenced the final compromise reached by the
Parliament and the Council in September 2010. The new supervision framework
they agreed upon will enter into force on the 1st of January 20119.
The new supervisory framework, dubbed the European System of Financial
Supervision (EFSF), will include two levels of supervision. The first level deals
with macro prudential supervision, with an objective of monitoring and assess-
ing the overall stability of the financial system. This shall be carried out by a new
European supervisory body called the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
The European Central Bank will play an important role in the ESRB, by provid-
ing administrative support and an important part of the data. Furthermore, cen-
tral bankers will be well represented in the ESRB’s decision-making bodies.
The second level of supervision is concerned with micro prudential issues, i.e.
the individual financial institutions. In contrast to the macro level, micro pru-
dential supervision will be carried out by a multitude of supervisors. On one
side, Member States’ supervisory authorities will carry out the day-to-day super-
vision of financial institutions. On the other, three European Supervisory
Authorities (ESAs) are to coordinate national supervision. They will equally
work towards a so-called single European rulebook, i.e. a single set of core rules,
applied to all the relevant European financial institutions. These three ESAs are
known as the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and
7. DE LAROSIÈRE, J., et al., Report High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, 25 February
2009.
8. Ibid.
9. See the annex for a list of legislation that puts in place the new supervisory framework.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA). Each of them will deal with the corresponding seg-
ments of the financial industry. They will be created by reforming existing EU
Committees and will thus not be entirely new10. In addition, a joint committee
of ESAs is to deal with cross-sectoral matters.
This supervisory framework will considerably alter financial supervision in the
EU. The EU bodies will have a more prominent role, although a distinction
should be made between macro and micro prudential supervision. Micro level
EU supervision, i.e. the ESAs will have substantial, binding powers to harmonise
rules and supervisory practices, but they will not have a major role in actual
supervision. At the macro level, the opposite is true. In this case, the ESRB will
be the chief supervisor, while it will not have any coercive powers. At any rate,
the work of the ESRB will be challenging, as it will have to warn policymakers
against unsustainable growth. Despite the increased role of EU supervisors, it is
clear that national supervisors will still remain crucially important, as they will
still be charged with the majority of supervisory tasks.
1.2. Supervision of Conglomerates
In the margin of the major reform of the financial supervisory framework, the
Commission also proposed to change the supervision of financial conglomer-
ates11. These large financial groups are already subject to supplementary super-
vision12, but the Commission considers that these rules need to be improved. It
seeks to obtain two main reforms. The first reform is to allow for simultaneous
banking and insurance supervision of financial conglomerates’ parent bodies.
As of now, some Member States’ legislation does not allow for such a combined
supervision. A second reform is to allow for non-quantitative indicators to iden-
tify financial conglomerates, instead of the current exclusive focus on balance
sheet figures. Such reform should allow supervisors to focus on those financial
groups that pose the largest group risks. The Commission hopes to see reforms
implemented in 2011.
10. These existing European Committees are: the European Banking Committee, the European Insurance
and Pensions Committee and the European Securities Committee.
11. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive amending Directives 98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC and
2006/48/EC as regards the supplementary supervision of financial entities in a financial conglomerate, 16
August 2010, COM(2010) 433 final.
12. Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a finan-
cial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC,
93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC, OJ L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1-27.7
2. The Gaps in European and National 
Regulation
The decennia leading to the financial crisis have often been characterised by
deregulation and self-regulation of the financial sector. Rules on complex finan-
cial products were for largely non-existent, with the underpinning idea that such
instruments are for professionals who should be wise enough to make well con-
sidered decisions Yet, as the financial crisis expanded it became evident that this
regulatory paradigm was erroneous13.
The financial sector proved unable to correctly assess or protect itself against its
risks. In order to fill the gaps in European and national regulation, the Commis-
sion made propositions in different areas, including financial products (deriva-
tives), actors (alternative investment funds, credit rating agencies and auditing
firms), capital and liquidity requirement rules and crisis management. Each of
these propositions will be discussed in detail in this chapter.
2.1. Derivatives
Derivatives are in essence securities whose values are based on underlying
assets14. This renders them rather complex financial products. Their complexity
increased considerably in the years preceding the crisis. In addition, derivatives
are mostly traded on a bilateral basis (called over-the-counter trade or OTC).
Due to these characteristics, derivatives led to large-scale market uncertainty
during the financial crisis, notably in the wake of the investment bank Lehman
Brothers’ default15.
In September 2010, the Commission – finally16 – published a legislative pro-
posal on derivative trading17. The main element of the Proposal is the generali-
sation of central clearing. This implies that derivate trading should be done
13. UNCTAD, The Global Economic Crisis: Systemic Failures and Multilateral Remedies, Report by the
UNCTAD Secretariat Task Force on Systemic Issues and Economic Cooperation, 2009.
14. The value of a derivative is thus determined by fluctuations in the underlying asset. Underlying assets
include bonds, commodities, currencies, market indexes, interest rates and stocks. For a full definition,
see: BANKS, E., The Palgrave Macmillan dictionary of finance, investment and banking, Basingstoke,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 150.
15. G20 Working Group 1, Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency, March 2009.
16. Already in October 2008 the Commission indicated that it sought to regulate derivative trading, see:
McCREEVY, C., Time for regulators to get a better view of derivatives. Statement on reviewing deriva-
tives markets before the end of the year, 17 October 2008, SPEECH/08/538.
17. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and
trade repositories, 15 September 2010, COM(2010) 484 final.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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through a Central Counterparty (CCP). Such a CCP acts as an intermediate
between sellers and buyer. In other words, it acts as a seller to every buyer and
a buyer to every seller. By generalising central clearing, the Commission seeks to
increase transparency and reduce counterparty risk.
Central clearing would be mandatory for all derivatives that are deemed eligible,
i.e. sufficiently standardized. The Proposal does not detail however which deriv-
atives are concerned. Instead, a number of broad criteria are listed in the Pro-
posal, allowing the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)18 to
determine whether a derivative should be centrally cleared19. Derivatives that
are not eligible for central clearing would not be prohibited, but their trade
would be subjected to additional requirements, notably supplementary capital
retention.
According to the Proposal, all derivative trading, be it centrally cleared or oth-
erwise, would have to be reported to a (private) trade repository, which act as a
central derivative trade data centre. These trade repositories would have to pro-
vide supervisors with specified information and publish aggregated data reports.
There will be a few exceptions to the aforementioned rules. First, certain public
bodies would be exempted from obligations outlined in the regulation20. Sec-
ondly, a special regime would be put in place for non-financial firms. They are
in principle exempted from reporting and clearing obligations, unless their trad-
ing exceeds certain thresholds when used for purposes other than risk mitiga-
tion21.
It should be clear that Central Counterparties will play a systemically important
role in future derivative trading. While these private firms are paramount in the
efforts to reduce the risk of derivative trading, they actually could lead to the
opposite if not well managed. The Commission Proposal sets out conditions for
CCP’s operation, including capital requirements and access to liquidity. With
regard to the latter, CCPs would require access to central or commercial bank
liquidity if needed. This is rather lenient compared to IMF recommendations22.
18. See supra (1.1. A New Supervisory Framework).
19. Determining the eligibility for central clearing would be based on criteria such as the systemic risk
involved, pricing information and the ability of CCPs to deal with the derivatives.
20. Central banks and public bodies who manage public debt would be exempted.
21. These thresholds are to be determined by the Commission on proposal by the ESMA.
22. The IMF favours stricter rules as it argues that in emergencies CCPs should have access to central
bank liquidity facilities, see: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report. Meeting New Challenges to Stability
and Building a Safer System, April 2010, p. 111.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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The proposed supervision of derivative trade seems somewhat incoherent. The
ESMA would be empowered to supervise trade repertories, while CCPs would
be supervised nationally. A main driver for the national supervision of CCPs is
that their failure would be financially borne by the Member States. This national
financial responsibility puts smaller Member States at a disadvantage, as it
would be harder for them to bailout a CCP.
Third country CCPs and trade repositories would only be authorized to deal
with the trade of derivatives by an EU trader if the third country’s legal and
supervisory framework is equivalent to that of the EU. Furthermore, an interna-
tional agreement between the EU and the third country on the matter would be
required.
The European Parliament and the Council need to strike an agreement on the
matter. Rules are projected to apply at the end of 2012. The Regulation will need
to be complemented by other EU legislation in order for it to be effective. Of
notable importance are the revision of the Capital Requirements Directive23
(setting out rules in bilateral derivative trade), MiFID24 (to oblige the use of
CCPs) and the Market Abuse Directive25 (to include bilaterally traded deriva-
tives). A complete set of rules governing derivative trade is thus far from immi-
nent.
2.2. Alternative Investment Funds
A hotly debated issue concerns so-called Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs).
These encompass a variety of funds, described as funds that are not harmonised
by the UCITS Directive26. These funds include private equity and hedge funds,
but also for example commodity funds, real estate funds and trusts. Their com-
mon feature is the fact that they were previously subject to light regulation. EU-
wide regulation thus constitutes a major change.
A major difficulty in regulating alternative investment funds is the fact that they
are often located in offshore financial centres27. Hence regulating funds located
23. See infra (2.5. Capital and Liquidity Requirements).
24. Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments, 30 April 2004, OJ L 145, p. 1-44.
25. See infra (5.1. Market Abuse).
26. Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities
(UCITS), OJ L 375, 31.12.1985, p. 3-18.
27. A main reason is tax avoidance, while light regulation plays a role as well. See: FUNG, W., HSIEH,
D., A primer on hedge funds, Journal of Empirical Finance, Volume 6, Issue 3, September 1999, pp. 309-
331.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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in Europe would only address a portion of funds operating in the EU. Alterna-
tive Investment Fund Managers (AIFMs) are on the contrary often located in
onshore financial centres like the City of London. For this reason, the EU seeks
to regulate the alternative investment funds managers rather than the funds
themselves.
The Commission published a legislative Proposal in April 200928. After long
debate both inside and between institutions, a compromise has been agreed
upon29. Under the future Directive, minimal harmonisation and mutual recog-
nition will apply. Alternative investment fund managers will need an authorisa-
tion by the Member State where they are located, which will be subject to a
number of requirements30. If a fund’s manager meets these requirements, he
obtains a so-called European passport, allowing him to operate in all EU Mem-
ber States. Fund managers that are located in the EU can benefit from such a
European passport from 2013 onwards. Managers of small funds, with assets
worth less than EUR 100 million (or EUR 500 million in case no leverage is
used31) will be subject to less demanding rules. They are only obliged to register
and are subject to a more simplified reporting process. Yet, they will not benefit
from a European passport, unless they voluntarily comply with the obligations
that apply to managers of larger funds.
One of the most contentious elements of the legislative discussions was third
country access. In the end, non-EU fund managers will be able to benefit from
a European passport, although only from 2015 onwards. In addition, they will
only be able to benefit from such a European passport if they and their country
of origin meet certain conditions. The fund managers will need to be subjected
to legislation and supervision that are “to the same effect32” as EU rules. Fur-
thermore, their home country should apply the relevant international standards
and exchange information with the EU, notably on tax issues.
28. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers,
COM(2009), 30 April 2009, COM (2009) 207 final.
29. Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers –
Council’s position agreed by ECOFIN, 20 October 2010, 15053/10.
30. These concern, inter alia, the appointment of a depository for its financial instruments, capital
requirements, risk management, reporting and disclosure rules.
31. In this case, a lock-in period of 5 years applies to investments made at the moment the alternative
investment fund was constituted.
32. In its original proposal, the Commission required equivalent rules and supervision. This had
prompted international protest, including by the US administration.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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2.3. Credit Rating Agencies
The role of credit rating agencies is to assess the creditworthiness of financial
products and actors. Credit ratings issued by these agencies are widely used by
investors in assessing risks. Regulatory requirements in fact oblige financial
institutions to take the ratings into account when determining their capital
needed. Even public bodies, such as the ECB, rely on credit ratings33. Yet, ratings
were found to be anything but foolproof. In the run-up to the financial crisis,
credit rating agencies did not adequately detect risks, especially with regard to
complex financial products. While several products received top-notch ratings,
they proved to entail high risks for investors34.
In 2009, the EU adopted a Regulation on credit rating agencies that aims to
tackle the sector’s shortcomings35. The regulation abandons the previous self-
regulation approach. Instead, credit rating agencies are subjected to supervision
and EU-wide rules. Credit rating agencies will only be allowed to operate in the
EU if they meet certain requirements. These include:
• Transparency requirements, entailing an annual transparency report, meth-
odology disclosure and specific notice when credit ratings concern complex
financial products.
• Corporate governance requirements, including an internal quality review
mechanism.
• Requirements that try to limit conflicts of interest. To this extent, a certain
proportion of credit rating agencies’ directors cannot receive incentives
based on business performances and credit rating agencies are not allowed
to provide advisory services.
The Regulation puts in place a particular regime for credit rating agencies that
are located outside the EU. Their ratings can only be used under specific condi-
tions. They need to be subjected to an equivalent system of regulation and super-
vision36, or should have an affiliated credit rating agency in the EU that endorses
their rating.
33. Credit ratings are an eligibility criterion for accepting collateral in the ECB’s liquidity providing oper-
ations.
34. For an evaluation of the role of credit rating agencies in the financial crisis and its causes, see: G20
Working Group 1, op. cit.
35. Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies, OJ L 302,
17.11.2009, p. 1-31.
36. In this case, their ratings are not allowed to be used if they are of “systemic importance to the finan-
cial stability or integrity of the financial markets of one or more Member States” (Article 5(1)d of Regula-
tion No 1060/2009). Although depending on the exact interpretation, this is likely to force credit rating
agencies to have a registered office in the EU if they want to continue certain rating activities. For some
this might prove too expensive, which could reduce competition between credit rating agencies in the EU.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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In June 2010, the same month as the aforementioned Regulation fully entered
into force, the Commission already proposed a revision of applicable rules37.
The Commission proposed supplementary disclosure rules for a financial instru-
ment that results from securitisation operations38. If the issuer of such an instru-
ment commissions a rating from a credit rating agency, it would have to provide
the necessary information not only to that agency, but also to every credit rating
agency that requests so. These provisions seek to limit disadvantages associated
with the issuer-pays model, i.e. rating agencies are contracted by the firm whose
products they need to evaluate, which is common practice in the credit rating
sector. Yet, it should be clear that these additional disclosure rules are far from
universal given that they only apply to a specific type of complex financial
instruments.
The June 2010 Proposal also included provisions concerning the supervision of
credit rating agencies. According to the Proposal, the future European Securities
and Markets Authority39 (ESMA) would become solely responsible for the
supervision of credit rating agencies. National authorities’ only supervisory
function would consist of overseeing the use of credit ratings for regulatory
requirements (e.g. capital requirements), although the ESMA could delegate
additional supervisory tasks to them. With regard to enforcement, the ESMA
would be empowered to temporarily prohibit the issuing of credit ratings by a
specific credit rating agency, or suspend the use of its ratings. The Commission
would be able to impose pecuniary sanctions.
When combining the already adopted Regulation and the latest Commission
Propositions, it’s clear that progress is made in bringing credit rating agencies
into the regulatory and supervisory scope. Some important issues remain open
for improvement however. Firstly, the issuer-pays model is not thoroughly ques-
tioned. Secondly, credit ratings are still extensively used for regulatory purposes.
Finally, the credit rating sector is said to lack competition40. The Commission
plans to propose yet another revision of the rules applicable to credit rating
agencies in 2011, which should address these issues41.
37. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on
credit rating agencies, 2 June 2010, COM(2010) 289 final.
38. So-called rated structured finance instruments, for the full definition see: Article 4(36) of Directive
2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ
L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 201-255. For more information on securities, see footnote 49.
39. See supra (1.1. A New Supervisory Framework).
40. LANNOO, K., What reforms for the credit rating industry? A European perspective, ECMI Policy
Brief, No. 17, October 2010, pp. 5-6.
41. European Commission, Commission Work Programme 2011, Volume II, Annex I: Strategic initiatives
scheduled for adoption in 2011, 27 October 2010, COM(2010) 623 final. A public consultation on the
subject has been launched in November 2010, see: European Commission, Public Consultation on Credit
Rating Agencies, 5 November 2010.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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In light of the Greek debt crisis European heads of state and government floated
the idea of creating a European credit rating agency as an additional measure to
improve the credit rating sector42. The Commission did not reject this idea. It
could introduce such a European credit rating agency in its 2011 Proposal. It is
doubtful however whether a public rating agency would be able to prevent a
sovereign debt crisis or significantly increase competition in the sector.
2.4. Auditing Firms
The role of auditing firms is to verify the accuracy of a company’s financial
statements. Such audits are required by European legislation43. In a sense, audit-
ing firms provide a service similar to credit rating agencies as their audits pro-
vide an important signal to regulators and stakeholders on the financial creden-
tials of a firm. Yet, auditors approved the financial statements of some financial
institutions that did not accurately reflect their true financial position. While
these problems were far smaller than those related to credit rating agencies, the
Commission seeks to reform the current legislation. In October 2010 it launched
a public consultation, paving the way for a legislative proposition in 201144.
The public consultation proposes measures in three main areas, similar to the
measures with regard to credit rating agencies.
Initial measures aim at to reducing potential conflicts of interests45. The Com-
mission suggests that, at least for the largest companies, supervisors could
choose which auditing firm to contract or oblige firms to rotate their auditing
firm on a regular basis.
Subsequent measures would need to increase competition in the market. As of
now, the global auditing market is dominated by four firms46, which according
to the Commission can create systemic risks. The Commission proposes a Euro-
pean passport for auditing firms, so that a firm based in a Member State can
operate across the EU. Additional measures to increase competition seem
unlikely.
42. European Council, Statement of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, 7 May 2010,
PCE 86/10.
43. Directive 2006/43/EC of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated
accounts, OJ L 157, p. 87-107.
44. European Commission, Green Paper on Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis, 13 October 2010,
COM(2010) 561 final.
45. As for credit rating agencies, a major issue is whether or not it is harmful that auditing firms are con-
tracted by the firms they audit. Another issue is the fact that auditing firms offer non-auditing services to
the very same firms they audit.
46. These auditing firms are Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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A final area where the Commission suggests legislative action is supervision. It
notably seeks to increase the role of European supervisors, for example by cre-
ating a new European Supervisory Authority or empowering an existing one. If
the idea of a European passport finds support, the European supervisor could
issue them.
2.5. Capital and Liquidity Requirements
Banks are required to hold a certain level of capital in order to assure they have
sufficient buffers in case problems arise. The applicable rules are laid down in
the Capital Requirements Directive47 (CRD). The existing requirements proved
inadequate to prevent the financial crisis from occurring. Important shortfalls in
capital requirements include the inadequate assessment of risks, their pro-cycli-
cality48 and their lack of attention for liquidity buffers. Since the crisis erupted,
the Commission has proposed three reforms.
The first reform has resulted in a Directive (Capital Requirements Directive II
or CRD II) that was published in September 200949. Member States have to
apply the rules of the Directive from 2011 onward. The Directive brings about
the following changes:
• The supervision of cross-border banking groups is strengthened.
• Financial institutions that rely heavily on a single counterparty will be more
closely supervised.
• Higher capital requirements will be imposed in case of securitisation prac-
tices, which were an important factor in the financial crisis50. If these are
traded, the financial institution from who originates the product will have to
retain 5% of the traded risk.
Rules on liquidity requirements are introduced. Liquid asset reserves, liquidity
stress tests and contingency planning need to prevent financial institutions from
facing a liquidity crisis, as occurred during the financial crisis.
47. The Capital Requirements Directive actually comprises two Directives, namely Directive 2006/48/EC,
op. cit. and Directive 2006/49/EC, op. cit.
48. A revision of accounting rules is also of vital important to reduce pro-cyclicality. Yet, these reforms
are decided on the international level.
49. Directive 2009/111/EC amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards
banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrange-
ments, and crisis management, 16 September 2009, OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 97-119.
50. Securitisation is the process of repackaging assets, liabilities or cash flows into tradable securities.
Securitisation enabled financial institutions to trade risks associated to loans (including inferior quality
subprime loans). This led to spreading risks throughout the financial system and decreased the due dili-
gence of financial institutions. See: KAPOOR, S., The Financial Crisis – Causes & cures, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, Bertelsmannstiftung and ETUI, 2010, pp. 79-80.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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Even before this Directive was adopted, the Commission already proposed a
second set of changes to the Directives on capital requirements (CRD III)51. The
European Parliament and the Council have reached an agreement on its con-
tent52. The goals of this Directive are similar to the ones of the aforementioned
CRD II, but their scope is different. The Directive will increase capital require-
ments for re-securitisations53 and for assets that banks hold in their trading
book54. Both will also be subject to more stringent disclosure rules. The overuse
of the trading book will be further limited by increasing the required assess-
ments of risks contained therein. The Directive furthermore sets out rules on
remuneration55. The capital requirements rules of the Directive should be imple-
mented by 2012.
The third capital requirements reform (CRD IV) is still at an early stage. For
now, the Commission has finished public consultations56 and a hearing on seven
potential action areas57. Its outcome will depend heavily on the future reforms
of the Basel capital framework. These reforms will lead to more stringent inter-
national rules on capital and liquidity requirements, including countercyclical
buffers58.
2.6. Crisis Management of Financial Institutions
The financial crisis has shown that previous mechanisms to deal with bank fail-
ures were largely insufficient, especially in cross-border situations. The Com-
51. European Commission, Amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital require-
ments for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies,
13 July 2009, COM(2009) 362 final.
52. Council of the European Union, Directive 2010/.../EU of … amending Directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the super-
visory review of remuneration policies, 30 September 2010, PE-CONS 35/10.
53. Re-securitisations are securitisations that are composed of underlying securitisations.
54. A financial institutions’ trading book is a portfolio of financial instruments that the institution regu-
larly buys and sells. Financial instruments which are to be held until they mature are held in the banking
book. Capital requirements for the trading book are traditionally less demanding then requirements for
the banking book. For a definition, see: The Palgrave Macmillan dictionary of finance, investment and
banking, op. cit.
55. See infra (4.1 Remuneration).
56. European Commission, Possible Further Changes to the Capital Requirements Directive, Consulta-
tion Document, 26 February 2010 and European Commission, Countercyclical Capital Buffer, Consulta-
tion Document, 22 October 2010.
57. The potential action areas are: liquidity standards, definition of capital, leverage ratio, counterparty
credit risk, countercyclical measures, systemically important financial institutions and a single rule book
in banking.
58. In September 2010 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reached an agreement on new capital
rules (so-called Basel III rules). The rules are set to be endorsed at the G-20 meeting in November 2010.
See: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces
higher global minimum capital standards, 12 September 2010, retrievable on http://www.bis.org/press/
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mission seeks to address the issue by creating a European crisis management
framework. A proposal is expected in spring 2011, which is rather late. By
delaying such a vital part of financial legislative reform, the window of oppor-
tunity for significant regulatory reform risks being closed.
In October 2010, the Commission published a Communication outlining its
future proposal59. The overarching aim of the Commission is to allow credit
institutions to fail with minimal influence on financial stability and without bail-
outs by public authorities. To achieve this aim, the Commission proposes har-
monising rules in three subsequent parts of crisis prevention and management.
First of all, it seeks common rules for preparatory and preventive measures. This
includes drawing up recovery and resolution plans for banks (so-called living
wills). Furthermore, supervisors could request a bank to change its business
operations and corporate structure. Such intrusion in the management of a bank
might meet significant opposition by Member States.
Secondly, the Commission proposes to provide supervisors with early interven-
tion powers if problems are detected. The Commission suggest allowing super-
visors to intervene once a bank is likely to fail its capital requirements, although
this trigger requires more precise definition60. In such a case, supervisors would
be able to prohibit the payment of dividends and could force a bank to abandon
certain business activities. Furthermore, it would be authorised to replace man-
agers or even appoint a temporary CEO.
The final field in which the Commission proposes harmonised rules concerns the
resolution of a bank. Such a resolution should only occur when there is no realistic
prospect of recovery, although the Commission again still needs to define specific
thresholds. During such a resolution phase, authorities would be able to sell a
bank or parts thereof without the consent of shareholders. In addition, it would
be empowered to write off shares and write down debt or convert it into equity61.
Besides harmonising rules, the Commission also seeks to improve cross-border
cooperation in the preparation and management of bank crises. However,
important actors will remain at the Member State level, with only voluntary
cross-border coordination. The European Supervisory Authorities62 would only
59. European Commission, Communication on an EU Framework or Crisis Management in the Financial
Sector, 20 October 2010, COM(2010) 579 final.
60. Currently, supervisors can only intervene when a bank is failing its capital requirements, which the
Commission deems too late.
61. Such a conversion would constitute a so-called bail-in.
62. See supra (1.1. A New Supervisory Framework).ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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play a minor role. As their mediation and crisis management may not impinge
on the financial responsibilities of a Member State, their role will be limited
mainly to non-binding supervision and coordination. It is doubtful whether
these provisions would prevent the lack of cross-border coordination we faced
during the financial crisis63.
To finance bank resolutions, the Commission has proposed a bank levy64. Yet,
it did not propose to set up a single European-wide fund for all Member States.
Instead, a patchwork of national funds governed by a single set of EU-rules has
been proposed. This seems likely to constitute a disadvantage for smaller Mem-
ber States as they would proportionally need larger funds (in relation to their
GDP) to finance the resolution of a given bank. The proposition is further crit-
icised by Member States, as they want to use the bank levy for their general
budget. The IMF has toned down the budgetary difference between the two
approaches65. Furthermore, bank resolution funds could, it is argued, lead to
moral hazard as banks risk seeing the funds as an insurance premium. In any
case, excluding the possibility of a public bail-out seems somewhat naive. The
EU could instead work out ways to split the cost of such a bail-out among its
Member States.
The aforementioned rules would only apply to credit institutions66 and invest-
ment banks that are deemed to represent a systemic risk. Crisis management for
other types of financial institutions would be regulated at a later stage. In addi-
tion, the Commission plans to harmonise national bank insolvency rules. Yet,
according to the Commission’s planning, legislation in both fields will most
likely not be adopted in the coming years67. By this stage, the momentum for
reforms created by the financial crisis is likely to have faded away completely.
63. Notably the Fortis break-up.
64. European Commission, Communication on Bank Resolution Funds, 26 May 2010, COM(2010) 254
final.
65. In a report to the G-20, the IMF states that it “makes no substantive difference to the public sector’s
financial position whether a levy accrues to general revenues or to a fund that invests in government secu-
rities”. See: IMF, A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector – Interim Report for the G-
20, 2010, p. 13.
66. A credit institution is an undertaking which both receives deposits from the public and grants credits.
For the full definition, see: Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC, op. cit.
67. The Commission plans to publish a preliminary report by the end of 2011 on the resolution of other
types of financial institutions. A report on harmonising bank insolvency rules is planned for end 2012.19
3. Confidence in the Financial Sector
Confidence is vital to the banking system. People need to be confident that their
deposits are safely managed. If not, they will withdraw their savings. Under the
modern banking system, banks use fractional-reserve banking, which implies
that they lend more money than they have obtained via deposits. Therefore, if a
large number of depositors want to withdraw their deposits in a short time-
frame, the bank could fail, as well as the banking system as a whole.
The financial crisis saw many losing confidence in the banking sector, with
important consequences68. The existing provisions proved unable to maintain
confidence. The EU has taken multiple actions to address the issue. These cover
retail investment, guarantee schemes, as well as lending and borrowing.
3.1. Packaged Retail Investment Products
Consumers or retail investors are what could be considered ‘non-professional
investors’. The Commission believes that these investors benefit from a simple
legislative framework and clear investment information. This is especially useful
when more complex investment products are at stake. This includes packaged
investment products, which are investment products that are composed of mul-
tiple underlying financial assets69.
Packaged retail investment products are currently governed by sectoral direc-
tives and crosscutting legislation of which the MiFID70 and the IMD71 are of
particular importance. The Commission believes that the legislative framework
is too fragmented. Furthermore, according to the Commission, the framework
contains several holes. The complex and incomplete nature of this legislation is
seen as harmful when it comes to instilling confidence in these products72. A
legislative proposal on packaged retail investment products will be published in
201173.
68. Liquidity problems were a major issue in the crisis and were partly caused by deposit withdrawal.
69. For a complete definition, see: European Commission, Communication on Packaged retail investment
products, 30 April 2009, COM(2009) 204 final.
70. Directive 2004/39/EC, op. cit.
71. Directive 2002/92/EC on insurance mediation, 15 January 2003, OJ L 9, p. 3-10.
72. European Commission, Communication on Packaged retail investment products, op. cit.
73. Letter by Commission President Barroso to the Members of the European Parliament, 7 September
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In April 2009, approximately two years before the expected legislative propos-
als, the Commission published a Communication on packaged retail investment
products laying out its envisaged future proposition. The institution wants to
establish a horizontal approach towards packaged retail investment products.
Complexity would nevertheless remain, as two fields of action would be dealt
with by separate acts. Initially, a set of rules on the information to be provided
to retail investors would be developed using provisions of the UCITS Directive74
as a benchmark. Secondly, the selling of Packaged Retail Investment Products
would be submitted to a set of rules where MiFID would serve as a point of
reference. The complex nature of such legislation is not necessarily a problem,
as long it results in a coherent framework that provides clear and easily accessi-
ble information to retail investors.
3.2. Guarantee Schemes
Guarantee schemes aim at safeguarding the public against certain unforeseeable
events, notably the failure of a financial institution. EU rules have been in place
for over a decade for both Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation
Schemes. Both will be revised. In addition, the Commission wishes to introduce
EU rules on Insurance Guarantee Schemes.
Deposit Guarantee Schemes
A system of Deposit Guarantee Schemes serves to protect European depositors.
If a financial institution fails, these schemes are to ensure that deposits can be
redeemed up to a predetermined amount. The initial European rules on the mat-
ter were adopted in 199475. In the heat of the financial crisis, the system was
amended by a new Directive76.
This Directive, adopted in March 2009, was largely aimed at restoring short-
term confidence in the financial system. It changes the rules applicable to
Deposit Guarantee Schemes in the following fields:
• The minimum level of coverage is initially increased from EUR 20 000 to
EUR 50 000. This will be further increased to EUR 100 000 at the end of
2010.
• The principle of co-insurance has been abandoned. Before, Member States
74. Council Directive 85/611/EEC, op. cit.
75. Directive 94/19/EC of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes, OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5-14.
76. Directive 2009/14/EC amending Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes as regards the
coverage level and the payout delay, OJ L 68, 13.3.2009, p. 3-7.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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could limit the coverage of deposits to 90%. Now full coverage (100%) is
required.
• The payout period in case of problems has been significantly reduced.
Deposit Guarantee Schemes had to compensate depositors within three
months, with a possibility to increase the period to nine months in excep-
tional cases. This is reduced to twenty working days with a possibility to
extend it to thirty working days in exceptional cases.
In July 2010, the Commission proposed a further revision of the rules on
Deposit Guarantee Schemes77. It should allow for a more profound and more
concerted revision of the Directive. The Commission’s Proposal would put in
place fully harmonised rules that would replace the current minimum harmoni-
sation. Yet, a pan-European Deposit Guarantee Scheme wouldn’t be introduced,
although the Commission will report on the matter by 2014. The Commission
proposes four main changes.
First, the Commission proposes to set the coverage level at EUR 100 000 across
the EU. Only specific exceptions would allow for greater coverage (for example
real estate transactions). Second, deposit protection would apply to every type
of company. This is in clear contrast with some Member States’ current rules
that exclude large companies from benefiting from such Schemes. Third, the
payout period would be further shortened to seven calendar days.
Finally, the Commission proposes a system for financing Deposit Guarantee
Schemes. A cascade financing system would be established. In first instances,
schemes would be financed by ex-ante funds. If this proved inadequate, ex-post
funds would be used. If these are also insufficient, a Deposit Guarantee Scheme
could borrow from other Schemes. If all this still proved insufficient, alternatives
means of funding would be used, although the Commission refrains from detail-
ing this type of funding. Repayment might still prove difficult, despite these pro-
visions. This is especially true if several Schemes need to repay deposits within
a short time frame, as it would put stress on the entire system.
The Proposition has run into opposition from several Member States, most
notably from the German and Swedish Parliaments. The financing of Deposit
Guarantee Schemes is particular controversial78. The changes to the Directive
might thus prove to be significantly different than the Commission Proposal.
77. European commission, Proposal for a Directive …/…/EU on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [Recast], 12
July 2010, COM(2010)368 final.
78. The German Bundesrat and the Swedish Riksdagen both stated that the proposal runs against the
principle of subsidiarity. See: Interparliamentary EU Information Exchange, Dossier COD/2010/0207,
retrievable on http://www.ipex.eu/ipex/cms/home/Documents/dossier_COD20100207.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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Investor Compensation Schemes
EU rules on Investor Compensation Schemes have been in place since 199779.
The Schemes offer compensation in case an investment firm is unable to return
assets that belong to investors due to, inter alia, fraud or negligence. It does not
however protect against ordinary risks associated with investments (e.g. capital
risk, liquidity risk, currency risk...).
In 2010, the Commission proposed to revise legislation governing Investor
Compensation Schemes80. The main proposed changes are:
• A compensation level fixed at EUR 50 000, thus excluding any compensa-
tion of higher value.
• Full coverage by the Schemes, thus excluding co-insurance.
• The adoption of funding arrangements, including the possibility of borrow-
ing between Schemes if required.
• A reduction of the payout delay, although the Commission Proposal only
requires partial compensation within nine months after a firm is declared
unable to repay the investor.
• An extension of the schemes’ coverage, e.g. to include UCITS products and
the failure of third party custodians.
These changes are in line with those proposed for Deposit Guarantee Schemes.
Rules would equally become more harmonised at the EU level, but no EU-wide
scheme would be introduced.
Insurance Guarantee Schemes
Protection against insurance failure, i.e. in case an insurer is unable to fulfil its
obligations, is not common practice in the EU. Only 11 out of 27 Member States
offers such insurance81. In its related July 2010 White Paper, the Commission
proposes EU rules that would render Insurance Guarantee Schemes mandatory.
In contrast to the Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Schemes, the
EU rules would only require minimum harmonisation, thus refraining from set-
ting maximum protection levels. Formal legislative proposals are to be pub-
lished in 201182.
79. Directive 97/9/EC of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes, OJ L 84, 26.3.1997, p. 22-31.
80. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 97/9/EC on investor compensa-
tion schemes, 12 July 2010, COM(2010) 371 final.
81. These countries are: Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania,
Spain and the United Kingdom.
82. European Commission, White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes, 12 July 2010, COM(2010)
370.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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3.3. Lending and Borrowing
The subprime lending crisis in the US, which in many ways ignited the financial
crisis, has shown that overly flexible lending facilities can be harmful to borrow-
ers, lenders, as well as the economy at large. A consultation83 and public hear-
ing84 on responsible lending and borrowing have been organised by the Com-
mission. The goal is to devise a legislative proposal, which is set to be published
in 201185. The Commission seeks to put in place rules on information to be
provided by the borrower and lender. Furthermore, lenders would need to better
take the reimbursing powers of borrowers into account. Parallel to these efforts,
there has been an expert study group86 and a consultation87 on the access to and
availability of consumer credit history. There seems to be a consensus among
experts to work towards a harmonisation rather than a pan-European credit
register.
83. European Commission, Public Consultation on Responsible Lending and Borrowing in the EU, 15
June 2009.
84. European Commission, Hearing of 3 September 2009on responsible lending and borrowing, 7 Octo-
ber 2009.
85. European Commission, Commission Work Programme 2011, op. cit.
86. European Commission, Report of the Expert Group on Credit Histories, May 2009.
87. European Commission, Summary of responses to the public consultation on the report of the expert
group on credit histories, 30 November 2009.25
4. Risk Management in Financial 
Institutions
Excessive risk taking was a major cause of the financial crisis. As aforemen-
tioned, EU regulators try to reduce risks, for example by modifying capital
requirements, enhancing regulation on products and reducing the dependency
on credit rating agencies. Yet, the EU also seeks to modify the way financial
institutions themselves manage their risk. To this extent, it seeks to alter remu-
nerations policies and rules concerning corporate governance.
4.1. Remuneration
Financial institutions in the EU and elsewhere have been heavily criticised for
their remuneration schemes. The high bonuses and golden parachutes in the
financial sector are seen by some as inappropriate and even counterproduc-
tive88. As the Commission states, the general aim of EU initiatives is to align
remunerations with long-term objectives rather than short-term risk-taking89.
To this end, both soft and binding legislative initiatives have been adopted.
In terms of soft law, the Commission published two Recommendations on the
matter. The first Recommendation deals with the remuneration of directors in
general, including those of financial institutions90. The second Recommenda-
tion specifically deals with remuneration in the financial sector91. However, the
impact of both Recommendations would arguably be limited, as they are not
legally binding.
These measures contrast with rules laid down in the aforementioned Capital
Requirements Directive III92 that will have a greater impact, due to its binding
nature. It contains rules on three important types of remuneration related rules.
Firstly, it lays down rules regarding the governance of remuneration policies.
The Directive notably requires independent control of remunerations in the
88. See for example: BRUNNERMEIER, M., CROCKETT, A. (e.a.), The Fundamental Principles of
Financial Regulation, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2009.
89. European Commission, Recommendation on remuneration policies in the financial services sector, 30
April 2009, C(2009) 3159, p. 3.
90. European Commission, Recommendation complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/
162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies, 30 April 2009,
C(2009) 3177.
91. European Commission, Recommendation on Remuneration policies in the financial services sector, 30
April 2009, C(2009) 3159.
92. Council of the European Union, Directive 2010/.../EU of … amending Directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the super-
visory review of remuneration policies, PE-CONS 35/10.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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financial institutions and the set-up of a remuneration committee. Secondly,
transparency rules are introduced that oblige financial institutions to annually
publish information on their remuneration policies and practices.
The most far-reaching element of the Directive is its limits to variable remuner-
ations, i.e. bonuses. These rules apply to staff that has a material impact on the
risk profile of the financial institution. They stipulate the following:
• At least half of such staff’s variable remunerations is to consist of ownership
entitlements (e.g. shares) or instruments that can be converted to ownership
entitlements in case of contingency.
• At least 40% of their variable remuneration (60% in case of high amounts)
is to be deferred for at least 3 years.
• More strict rules apply to financial institutions that have benefited from state
aid. For example, variable remunerations for senior management of such
institutions require justification.
The Directive’s rules pertaining to remuneration should take effect in January
2011. Many of the rules need further detailing from the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors93, for example by stipulating the required balance between
variable and fixed remunerations and defining ‘high’ amounts of variable remu-
nerations.
4.2. Corporate Governance
Besides rules on the remuneration policy in financial institutions, the Commis-
sion plans to propose measures vis-à-vis corporate governance in financial firms.
In June 2010, it launched a Green Paper and public consultation on the topic94.
The Commission proposes measures, inter alia, to address the supervisory role
of senior management, remuneration policies and the involvement of sharehold-
ers, financial supervisors and external auditors.
Some of the propositions are quite far-reaching, such as limiting the number of
boards on which a director may sit, demanding a level of diversity amongst the
board of directors in terms of gender and background, disclosure of institutional
investors’ voting practices and reinforcing civil and criminal liability of direc-
tors. The Commission plans to propose measures in 2011. It is not yet known
to what extent these would include binding legislation.
93. In 2011 this Committee will be replaced by the European Banking Authority, see supra (1.1. A New
Supervisory Framework).
94. See: European Commission, Green Paper on Corporate governance in financial institutions and remu-
neration policies, 2 June 2010, COM(2010) 284 final.27
5. Market Wrongdoing
Governments prohibit certain ways of conduct deemed abusive, in order to
allow financial markets to function properly. In the EU, rules been has grouped
in the Market Abuse Directive. Since the financial crisis erupted, there have been
calls to revise this Directive and to limit additional forms of market behaviour,
especially with regard to short selling and credit default swaps. In contrast to
other regulatory proposals in the field of financial regulation, there seems to be
less of a consensus on the need of actions in case of market wrongdoing.
5.1. Market Abuse
The original Market Abuse Directive (MAD) was adopted in 200395. The Direc-
tive covers rules on insider dealing and market manipulation. The financial crisis
did apparently not lead to a significant increase of these types of market wrong-
doings96. Yet, the de Larosière report found sanctioning weak and heterogene-
ous97. The Commission therefore plans to review the Directive. A Commission
proposal on the matter is expected in 201198. The latter will have three main
objectives. Firstly, enlarge the scope of the Market Abuse Directive in order to
cover new markets and instruments. Secondly, increase the supervision and
enforcement mechanisms99. Finally, the Commission wants to better harmonise
rules by limiting the options and discretions of Member States. Common EU
rules are not envisaged. If the European Parliament and the Council reach a
timely consensus, rules would apply from July 2012 onwards.
5.2. Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps
Short selling and credit default swaps (CDS) have been regularly subject to the
mistrust of policymakers, notably during recent periods of market turmoil. This
is not very surprising as both of them are used for speculating on negative mar-
ket evolutions. Although, the Commission states that short selling and credit
default swaps as such do not constitute market abuse, it finds them potentially
95. Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse),
OJ L 96, 12.4.2003, p. 16-25.
96. European Commission, Public Consultation on a Revision of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), 25
June 2010, p. 2.
97. DE LAROSIÈRE, J., op. cit., p. 23.
98. European Commission, Commission Work Programme 2011, op. cit.
99. The Commission envisages publishing a specific Communication on sanctions in the financial services
sector along with its proposal to revise the Market Abuse Directive.ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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harmful in periods of market stress100. As a result, it proposed in September
2010 legislation dealing with both short selling and credit default swaps101.
Short Selling
Short selling is a market strategy that aims to profit from a decrease in a secu-
rity’s value. It consists of selling a security that the seller does not own at the
time of the transaction102. The seller may have arranged to acquire the security
he sells (e.g. he can have borrowed it or taken measures to do so) which is called
‘covered’ short selling. In contrast to ‘covered’ short selling, the seller can also
agree to short sell a security within a certain timeframe, without having made
prior arrangements to acquire it. This is called ‘uncovered’ or ‘naked’ short sell-
ing. It entails higher risks than covered short selling as the seller is not guaran-
teed to obtain the security.
With its proposal, the Commission seeks to achieve the following goals:
• Increase transparency in short selling practices. When a market participants
is engaged in a number of short sell operations of a share that exceeds a
certain threshold103 he has to notify the regulator of his short sell position.
If the market participant exceeds a higher threshold104, he has to make his
position public. In addition, share sell orders in a trading venue that involve
short selling have to be marked (also referred to as flagging). Different rules
apply to short selling of sovereign bonds. In that case a market participant
would not be obliged to make its short sell position public and no marking
obligations would apply.
• Harmonise rules on temporarily restricting or banning short selling.
National regulators would be able to do so if there is a serious threat to
market stability or market confidence. If a national regulator does not ade-
quately address a threat, the European supervisor (ESMA)105 would be
allowed to take measures. These measures would furthermore override the
actions taken by national regulators. Under the Commission Proposal, the
ESMA would however not be able to undo a ban on short selling imposed
by a national regulator.
100. There is, however, far from a consensus on the matter. See for example: IMF, Staff Comments on EU
Commission Consultation on Short Selling, August 5 2010, 17 p., http://www.imf.org/external/np/eur/
2010/pdf/080510.pdf and FOTAK, V., RAMAN, V., YADAV, P., Naked Short Selling: The Emperor’s
New Clothes?, Working Paper Series, University of Oklahoma, 2009, 55 p.
101. European Commission, Proposal for a regulation on Short Selling and certain aspects of Credit
Default Swaps, 15 September 2010, COM(2010) 482.
102. A similar strategy which bets on an increase in the value of a security is called long selling.
103. A net short position of 0.2% of issued share capital.
104. A net short position of 0.5% of issued share capital.
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• Limit uncovered short selling. According to the Proposal, a market partici-
pant would only be able to short-sell a security if he has taken the appropri-
ate measures to acquire it106. Plain uncovered short selling would thus be
prohibited.
The Commission Proposal contains some exemptions to the aforementioned
rules. These exemptions would apply in case a share’s principal market is out-
side the EU or in case actions are deemed non-detrimental107.
Credit Default Swaps
In contrast to short selling, a credit default swap is a derivative (thus a financial
instrument), not an investment strategy. The buyer of a CDS pays a fee to the
seller. In return, the seller of the CDS commits to compensate the buyer in case
a credit instrument (loan or bond) fails to meet its debt obligations.
One of the most commonsense uses of a CDS is for a bondholder to protect
himself against the default of that bond. However, it is also possible to buy a
CDS ‘naked’ (or ‘uncovered’). In this case, the buyer of the CDS does not own
the credit instrument that the CDS protects against failure. A main reason for
buying uncovered CDS is speculating on an increase of the probability of a
default. During the eurozone sovereign debt crisis policymakers distrusted such
actions, as they added to doubts on the creditworthiness of sovereign debt.
The Commission Proposal would require notifying the regulators of an uncov-
ered position of Member State debt CDS that exceeds a certain threshold108.
Regulators would also be able to demand additional information on CDS trans-
actions. Finally, a national regulator would be able to restrict both covered and
uncovered CDS transactions. The competences of national regulators and the
ESMA in restricting CDS transactions would be similar to those in case of short
selling.
106. This can be done by borrowing it, entering into an agreement to borrow or having a third party
reserve the security.
107. Namely so-called market making and primary market operations.
108. To be determined by the Commission.31
CONCLUSION: IS IT ENOUGH?
A simple, but crucial question lingers after highlighting EU regulatory actions
taken in response to the financial crisis: will it lead to a sound and secure finan-
cial system? The question cannot be answered easily.
In terms of scope, the European response is rather comprehensive. The EU has
undertaken steps in a wide range of areas, notably supervision, regulation of
financial institutions, markets and products and risk and crisis management. In
this sense, the EU addresses the primary failings of financial regulation as iden-
tified by international reports.
Despite the ample scope, EU initiatives stop short of a radical overhaul of the
financial sector. The EU initiatives aim at moderate changes. Legislative stum-
bling blocks are often similar, such as the level of EU integration and conditions
for third country access. However, in some areas the EU response seems to be
particularly feeble, even when taking into account its rather moderate nature.
Two noteworthy examples are consumer protection and the systemic impor-
tance of financial institutions. In these areas, the United States’ actions are much
more far-reaching, respectively by creating a consumer protection agency and
curbing the size of financial institutions. Such initiatives are absent in the EU.
Furthermore, the focus of EU actions can be improved. In some cases, the prior-
ities of the Commission seem to be guided by popular purposes, rather than
genuine needs. Illustrative to this is the fact that it takes years to propose legis-
lation on an issue as crucial as crisis management, while rules on short shelling
– a secondary issue for many – were speedily proposed. Complexity alone does
not explain the difference. A lack of focus, combined with the EU’s lengthy leg-
islative process, can have harmful consequences. Momentum for decisive action
risks grinding to a halt by the time crucial decisions need to be taken. This would
no-doubt result in a less secure financial system.
Even if momentum for reforms would fade away in the future, it would not
change the fact that the EU’s response to the financial crisis has led to a consid-
erable increase of European financial regulatory integration. Some fields of the
financial sector will be covered by EU regulation for the first time, while other
fields face strengthened EU rules. In addition, the role of EU actors – notably EU
supervisors – will be enhanced. Yet, the strengthening of the EU level should not
be exaggerated. Member States remain crucial actors, both in terms of regula-
tion and supervision. The stability of the financial system continues to rely on
their willingness to coordinate national supervision, implement EU-rules andADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE EU’S INCOMPLETE REGULATORY RESPONSE
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adopt national legislation where required. Without such willingness, EU finan-
cial regulation is destined to fail.
Both national and EU measures can however not solve all the shortcomings of
financial regulation. A globalised financial sector requires an international
approach. Global cross-border cooperation and meaningful international stand-
ards are vital conditions for the safety of our European financial system. If not
achieved, regulatory arbitrage could lead to the same shortcomings that caused
the financial crisis. Nevertheless, this need for international cooperation does
not render EU actions irrelevant. They do have an impact and may moreover
facilitate a global agreement.
In summary, the EU’s regulatory response to the financial crisis is incomplete. Its
work to secure the financial system needs to be continued. However, new finan-
cial regulation will not remove all risk from the financial sector and nor should
it aim to do so. Inevitably, a difficult balance needs to be struck between secur-
ing our financial system and allowing it to support economic growth. Some risk
is inevitable. Yet, firmer regulation must prevent the financial sector from
repeating the mistakes made in the past. Inevitably, misplaced financial euphoria
and the resulting recklessness will reoccur in the future. It will be up to policy-
makers to prevent, detect and deal with these problems. Now is the time to
develop the appropriate instruments. The lessons of the financial crisis mustn’t
go to waste.33
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